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SUMMARY: Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership deci-
sion, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are or-
ganized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects
of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: rev-
enues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives
have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essen-
tially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to fi-
nance more profitable, but risky, long run investments.
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1.  Introduction
During the past two decades the wine sector has followed the general globaliza-
tion trend. International trade increased, direct foreign investment in all facets of the
industry is common, and viticulture is less and less linked to a specific region (ter-
roir). Underpinning much of this change are transfers of scientific knowledge, includ-
ing “business models”, and the tendencies for the qualitative and quantitative unifor-
mity of consumption. Countries of the southern hemisphere, such as Australia, that
previously imported European production technology, are now a source of knowledge
and economic engine of change to “Old World” wines. These changes have literally
uprooted the Old World wine industry as it attempts to address persistent excess pro-
duction brought on by aggressive production of “New World” wines.
Annual data published by International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV,
2008) show that in the last two decades there is excess production; world wine con-
sumption is 84% of annual production, on average. International trade of wines more
than doubled in the last 20 years. Exports jumped from 13.6% of world wine pro-
duction in 1987 to 29.4% in 2007. Global production and export pressures came prin-
cipally from the New World producers in Australia, Argentina, Chile and South
Africa. 
Old World producers have been slow to react. 
“..., due to the recent trend of global grape and wine oversupply, markets are
beginning to experience deep discounting as wineries look to clear out excess
inventory in order to make room for new vintages. To sustain their growth wine
producers will have two alternatives: either go along with the supermarket
chains and become global by investing in some of the main wine producing
countries, or develop a niche strategy (through a specific product, and or a
specific service) to differentiate themselves (Remaud and Couderc, 2006:
406).”
Increased world wine competition underpins a growing industrial concentration to
which the small-scale viticulture structure in much of the European Union may not
be able to respond. Changes in the wine sector are challenging the very core of gov-
ernance and ownership decisions, especially in southern European countries, like
Portugal, where large numbers of producers are organized in a few wine cooperatives
(WCs). Most of the WCs were founded during the 1950s and 60s in a top-down
process and in order to address capitalization problems arising from very small scale
wine processing, stocking and marketing. These cooperatives are legally organised
following traditional cooperative principles (i.e., open membership, democratic con-
trol, restricted residual claim and benefits to members proportional to patronage),
with poorly defined property rights and consequential difficulty in assuming risky
investments that could add value in the medium and long run. 
The Douro Demarcated Region (DDR), where twenty WCs comprise about 45%
of the total production and the majority follow the so-called “Mediterranean model”
of governance, is characterised by the adoption of traditional cooperative principles
and most of them with non-professional management.
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Like many agricultural cooperatives, the DDR-WCs increasingly face survival
challenges related to economic and financial issues, all of which are accentuated in
the last decades. Factors such as member equity, capital acquisition and redemption
are well known constraints on growth and sustainability that arise from ill-defined
property rights in a cooperative environment (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). These fac-
tors lead cooperatives to a situation where they have to opt between the immediate
patronage refund to patrons or reinforcing equity. Since both objectives are potential-
ly consistent with the traditional Mediterranean cooperative model, we examine
empirically both alternative objectives in the context of governance structure and of
control variables related to size. The econometric model uses panel data to evaluate
two competing/alternative indicators of DDR-WCs performance: (a) revenues trans-
ferred to members/patrons (share of gross revenue transferred to patrons), and (b)
equity/total asset ratio (inverse of leverage). The next section includes a brief litera-
ture review of the cooperative organization models. In the remaining sections, the
Douro Wine Cooperatives context is presented, followed by the econometric analysis
of DDR-WCs performance. Final remarks concerning some ideas on the viability of
traditional cooperatives under increasing pressures from a global and competitive
world environment conclude the paper.
2.  Cooperative organizational models
The economic justification of agricultural cooperatives is found at the level of
member  farms. Independent of the organizational model that they adopt, agricultur-
al cooperatives are successful if they provide their members a net economic benefit
higher than they can achieve individually or outside of the cooperative. As both main
suppliers of raw materials and equity, members decide on the cooperative’s retained
earnings, investments, and farmers’ output final price. However, since this price is
related to the retained earnings and because the price of the farm product delivered
by the members represent an important cost to the cooperative firm, the coopera-
tive’s profit is not, generally speaking, a useful measure of its performance (Rafat et
al., 2009).
In order to cope with the changes in the agribusiness and food industries, cooper-
atives are introducing organizational innovations, evolving from the traditional coop-
erative to a new typology of cooperative models that assumes a new property rights
structure of its members and governance.  
The traditional cooperatives are companies that work in a single, common market,
in which they are exposed to the same conditions as their competitors. These tradi-
tional cooperatives face problems similar to investor owned firms (IOF) but the solu-
tions need to be quite different because the two business forms pursue different objec-
tives. While traditional cooperatives try to maximize the patronage refund, via the
price paid to products supplied by the members, IOF seek to maximize its profits, i e,
the returns on capital, given a certain level of risk (Kyriakopoulos, 1997). 
The type of ownership, expressed by the structure of property rights and gover-
nance, particularly management authority delegated to professional managers and/or
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full time directors, is perhaps the best tool to analyze the incentives for the econom-
ic agents to create, maintain and improve their assets. Investments in cooperatives are
no exception. Drawing from property rights theory, Chaddad and Cook (2004) offer
a typology of six cooperative models: traditional cooperatives, proportional invest-
ment cooperatives, member investor cooperatives, new generation of cooperatives,
cooperatives with capital seeking companies and investor share cooperatives, whose
main difference is related to how property rights, in terms of residual claims and
residual rights control, are attributed to economic agents that supply equity to the
firm. These agents can be associated members (simultaneously investors and main
suppliers of the transformed and commercialized input) or simply investors.
In the traditional cooperative model the ownership rights are restricted to member-
patrons, residual return rights are non-transferable, non-appreciable and (partially)
redeemable and benefits (surplus) are distributed among members in proportion to
patronage (proportionally to the products delivered to the cooperative).
In the proportional cooperative model, property rights are restricted to members,
nontransferable, non-appreciable and redeemable, but members are expected to invest
in the cooperative in proportion to patronage. In member-investor cooperatives’
returns to members are distributed in proportion to shareholdings in addition to
patronage. In new generation cooperative model, property rights are in the form of
tradable and appreciable delivery rights restricted to current member-patrons. 
An alternative is to amplify the ownership rights linked to equity capital of non-
members, sharing profits and eventually control rights with outside investors who are
not necessarily patrons of the cooperative, and thus may have diverging interests
between the two groups. The most radical transformation is the conversion of the
cooperative to IOF. A strategy of the unit is to choose not to continue as a user-owned
and controlled organization, with the residual claim and control rights reassigned
among the firm’s stakeholders. Alternatively cooperatives may acquire risk capital
from outside investors, i.e. from capital seeking entities or investor shareholders. In
the first case, investors acquire ownership rights in a separate legal entity or partly
owned by the cooperative, with the outside investor not directly introduced in the
same, but rather in trust companies, strategic alliances, or a publicly held subsidiary.
In investor share cooperatives investors receive ownership rights in addition to own-
ership rights held by member patrons. In both models the shares are assigned to dif-
ferent ownership groups.  
The choice of the better organizational model is strictly linked to the performance,
whose measurement is the ongoing process toward achieving pre-determined objec-
tives (Bourne et al., 2003). In agricultural marketing cooperative, which is a mix of
vertical integration and horizontal coordination, the difficulties start with the concept
of the firm and continue with the definition and alignment of economic objectives.
Generally, the dominant viewpoint in the economic literature is to consider agricul-
tural cooperative as user-owned and user controlled organization that aims to benefit
its member-patrons, coexisting internally as different groups of stakeholders, namely
members and managers, each one with its own economics objectives, not necessary
aligned. 
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Rafat et al. (2009) present an ample review of the theoretical and empirical eco-
nomic literature on the performance of agricultural marketing cooperatives. They
conclude that empirical studies have failed1 to address cooperative objectives  as rep-
resented by the theoretical literature. Based on an overview of the studies on eco-
nomic behavior and on a list of empirical works on the performance of agricultural
marketing cooperatives presented by those authors, it is clear that the research on the
topic is mainly focused on: (a) implementing the behavior model of cooperative as a
profit-maximizing firm; (b) the use of financial ratios or frontier approach to analyze
performance; (c) cooperatives located on USA; (d) the dairy sector that has been
intensively studied. 
To analyze the influence of different stakeholders’ behavior on performance, the
coalition theory (Staatz, 1983) assumes that agricultural cooperative consists of many
groups, with each one attempting to maximize their individual utility, often at expens-
es of others groups. The game of allocating costs and benefits among groups can be
cooperative or non-cooperative. In a traditional cooperative (Rebelo et al., 2008) it is
expected that members try to maximize the price they receive for the products that
they deliver, being the performance measured by the financial ratio between patron-
age refund and gross revenue. 
According to the general formulation of the principal-agent model (Fama and
Jensen, 1983a and 1983b), if members are not able to monitor and enforce managers’
behavior, it is expected that these ones have incentive to maximize their utility instead
of the members’. It is especially true in the case of traditional cooperatives, where
managers are compensated on fixed wages, not on profitability, and it is expected that
mangers pursue risk minimizing strategies rather than return to members. In deter-
mining the cooperative capital structure (another indicator of performance) managers
are expected to show a preference for equity, because high leverage increases the
bankruptcy risk of the cooperative. Hence the hypothesis is that when managers with
power effectively influence the capital structure, the cooperative is less leveraged. 
The empirical studies that dominate the literature, concerning the financial per-
formance of agricultural cooperatives uses financial ratios (Rafat et al., 2009).
Otherwise, the interpretation and the expectation of the financial ratio depend on the
authors’ objective and on the definition of each value (Gentzolanis, 1997). For
instance, in traditional agricultural cooperatives, it is expected they are less leveraged
when managed by professional managers and/or full time directors, and the patron-
age refund decrease when managed by professional and/or full time directors. 
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data (if they exist at all), lack of interest on the part of applied economists, or lack of theoretical approa-
ches that are well developed for empirical application (Rafat et al., 2009: 457).
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3.  The Douro Wine Cooperatives2
The Douro Demarcated Region is situated in the northeast part of Portugal, on the
steep hills3 of the Douro Valley and its tributaries. In 1756, this region was demarcat-
ed to protect the quality of Douro wines against the competition of other Portuguese
wines. This was a pioneering decision at a world level, both in concept and regulat-
ing principles of controlled denominations of origin. Despite the geographical, insti-
tutional and administrative changes, the DDR constitutes a region with a collective
memory, with a strong tradition of grape farming and socio-economic specific char-
acteristics, classified as a world heritage site by UNESCO in 2001.
The DDR comprises an area of 250,000 hectares; vineyards occupy about 18% of
the land. There are 257,100 inhabitants, with a population density of 46.62 inhabi-
tants per km2. In the last 40 years, the region lost 40% of its population; the remain-
der is aging. 
In the last five decades, important changes occurred in the supply chain of both
Port and Douro wine. The industry is becoming horizontally/vertically integrated.
The formation of wine cooperatives produced significant changes in the supply chain,
becoming intermediaries of viticulturists and traders. Until the end of the 80s, and
coinciding with the entrance of Portugal in the EU, these cooperatives were mainly
focused in the vinification and storage activities, selling almost all of their wine pro-
duction in bulk to warehouses and traders. Market liberalization,  followed entrance
of Portugal into the EU, in 1986. Wine cooperatives began to market wine in bottles,
especially Douro table wine. 
Port and Douro wines followed a different evolution, especially during the last
thirty years. Firm concentration accelerated in the Port sector (Rebelo and Correia,
2008) along with upstream integration of commercial firms who planted new vine-
yards and built new vinification centres. These changes led many viticulturists, par-
ticularly the small and medium size ones, to concentrate on grape production in the
highly regulated, quota environment of Port production. In the case of the Douro table
wines, entrance into the EU began a phase of downstream vertical integration. Larger
viticulturists became producer-bottlers, yielding so-called wine of the quinta (farm).
Some of the wines quickly achieved domestic and international reputation. Niche
marketing provided important opportunities for wines that were traditionally less val-
ued in DDR. However, most Douro table wines are grown by very small farmers, who
are organized through cooperatives following the traditional cooperative principles.  
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2 Data used in this paper was collected both from the annual reports/accounting of cooperatives and
from three questionnaires to cooperative directors elaborated and conducted by the co-author Rebelo in
1990, 1998 and 2007.  These questionnaires included sets of quantitative (e.g. socio-economic characteri-
zation of members) and qualitative (e.g., what strategy do de DDR-WCs adopt) open and closed ques-
tions. The publication Quartenaire Portugal/UCP (2007), in which Rebelo participated, includes in annex
a version of this questionnaire.
3 Most of the vineyards are situated in steep hills. By decreasing order of slope, the 45,371 ha of vi-
neyards are distributed in the following way: 6,792 ha (>45%), 13,239 ha (30%-45%), 14,349 ha (15%-
30%), 9,786 ha (5%-15%) e 1,205 ha (<5%).
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In 2007, 19,884 viticulturists were members of the 20 DDR-WCs (both Port and
Douro table wine). Average vineyard size was less than one hectare. Moreover, most
of them are part-time viticulturists whose objective is to complement other sources of
income. They tend to view the cooperative as an organisation to which they can sell
their grapes and not as a firm in which they are the owners. This behaviour generates
high transactions costs, problems in equity acquisition and redemption, and difficul-
ties in developing clear entrepreneurial strategies that are responsive to changing mar-
kets. 
The number of DDR-WCs decreased from 22 to 20 during the last 20 years. These
cooperatives vinify 56% of Douro wine, 37% of Port wine and, consequently, 46% of
both types of wines. Many of the cooperatives produce both Port and table wines. 
A reduction in the Port wine production-quota has contributed the relatively poor
economic performance of the cooperatives over the past few years. Graph 1 shows
that Port wine grapes traditionally enjoy a three-fold premium above Douro table
wine grapes, so that the reduction in quota is particularly painful to the DDR-WCs
members. Additional economic pressure is coming from a sharp drop in all wine
grape prices that is largely attributable to the worldwide wine surplus. Both factors
have contributed to members leaving DDR-WCs in recent years, some of them with
the typical free-rider behaviour. 
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The distribution of land is shown in Table 1. The 45,160 ha of DDR vineyards are
distributed among the 39,506 viticulturists, for an average farm size of just 1.14
ha/farm. Note that roughly 35% of the DDR vineyards are owned by just 810 viticul-
turists, each with more than 8 ha of vines. The average farm size for this group is
around 19.7 ha. Most of these farms belong to producers-bottlers and traders of Port
wine. In contrast, small and medium size viticulturists are mostly members of DDR-
WCs. 
TABLE 1
Number of Farmers and Farm Size in DDR
Area Number Viticulturists % Ha Size %
Until 0,5 ha 23,743 60.1 4,221 9.3
From 0,5 ha to 2 ha 11,162 28.3 11,260 25.0
From 2 ha to 5 ha 3,134 7.9 9,649 21.4
From 5 ha to 8 ha 657 1.7 4,074 9.0
From 8 ha to 10 ha 201 0.5 1,802 4.0
More than 10 ha 609 1.5 14,154 31.3
Total 39,506 100.0 45,160 100.0
Source: Quaternaire Portugal / UCP (2007).
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The multiproduct structure of DDR-WCs is reflected not only in their composi-
tion but also in the change in asset structure experienced over the past few years
(Graph 2). Inventory grew at the expense of other assets, for more than a decade. In
the last data year, 2006, the value of the Total Assets, around 218 million euro, was
allocated 30.6% to Fixed Assets, 46.4% to Inventory and 23% to Other Assets. The
absolute value of inventories no doubt reflects seasonality of the data3 but the change
in relative share is not seasonally influenced, which may reflect difficulties in selling
Douro wines in a more competitive market. Total equity peaked at 30.1% in 1998,
slowly decreasing thereafter. 
The sales and gross revenue of DDR-WCs peaked in 2001 (100.3 and 119.2 mil-
lion euro, respectively), decreasing in the following years, reaching in 2006 a value
of 74.5 and 76.8 million euro, respectively. Roughly half of the sales and gross rev-
enue belonged to the three largest Port-dominated WCs. 
Not surprisingly, the value of Subsidiary and Raw Materials has been decreasing
since 2002 (Graph 3). In 2006, they dropped to 57 million euro or 74.3% of Gross
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2 The large proportion of Inventory in Total Assets may be explained by the fact that accounting va-
lues  are computed in December 31, before most of Port wine harvested is sold, reflecting a certain seaso-
nality. From the analysis of the Debt, the corresponding seasonality is reflected in the value of the debts to
members and bank loans.
GRAPH 1
Average Prices per Kilogram Paid for Grapes from Douro and Port Wines,
1987-2006
Years
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Source: Own elaboration.
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Revenue. The high proportion of Raw Materials to Goss Revenue indicates that, over-
all, the DDR-WCs are generating little value added production. This inference is con-
sistent with the fact that most of the wines, especially the greater value Port wines,
are sold in bulk.
Labour Costs have been increasing in recent years, peaking in 2006 at 5.6 million
euro (7.3% of Gross Revenue). A similar relation exists with Other Costs that reached
6.5 million euro in 2006 (8.5% of Gross Revenue). 
GRAPH 2
Relative trend of Total Assets Structure and Equity, 1987-2006
Years
Fixed assets Inventory Equity Other assets
Source: Own elaboration.
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GRAPH 3
Relative Weight of Costs and Net Profit in the Gross Revenue, 1987-2006
Years
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Each of the above financial and economic indicators point to the same conclusion:
economic viability of the industry is at risk. In the context of a global economy, a
change in cooperative property rights and governance structure must be forthcoming or
bankruptcy of DDR-WCs seems imminent and consistent with global industry trends. 
The 2007 questionnaire to cooperative directors revealed several socio-economic
factors that portend additional difficulties for DDR-WCs governance and survival.  
Member education. Most (69.2%) attended only primary school; 11.6% do not
know how to read and write. Only 12.9% completed the obligatory level of school-
ing; only 4.7% completed the high-school; and only 1.7% completed a university
or similar degree. This education level suggests a member profile that tends to be
risk adverse.
Member age. The largest percentage (48.3%) of the members is 40 to 60 years
and 38.9% are more than 60 years old. Only 13% of cooperative members are
under 40 years old. This age profile orients members toward a very short run per-
spective. 
Member involvement in cooperative decision making. 90% of cooperative
directors agreed (30% strongly agreed) that members behave in their narrow self-
interest, performing like private sellers of grapes when they sell their grapes to the
cooperative. Similarly, 90% of the directors believed that members favour short
run returns over long run growth. 
Full-time or part-time management. Most of the DDR-WCs directors (64%)
only work part time. In addition to the directors, 50% of DDR-WCs have a full
time manager/administrator. Both full time directors’ and managers’ returns
depend on a fixed wage unrelated to their performance. Accordingly, one would
expect the hired managers and full time directors to pursue risk minimising strate-
gies of reinforcing equity rather than return to members.
In summary, the socio-economic characteristics of DDR-WCs members show, on
the one hand, an inability of individual viticulturists to vertically integrate. They
simply are too small to do so. On the other hand, their age and education profile
seems to leave them incapable of making collective growth decisions that require
long-run investment and risk taking, at the expense of short-run returns from grape
sales to the cooperative. Most DDR-WCs appear to be hopelessly trapped in a risk
averse, traditional cooperative model, with minimal professional governance to
address the challenges of a global wine economy. If DDR-WCs are to survive in a
competitive world wine market, a change in cooperative model may be essential.
Although, based on panel data model, the econometric analysis provided in the next
section may clarify the influence of governance and size on two alternative indica-
tors of performance. 
4.  Econometric Analysis of DDR-WCs Performance
Each of the socio-economic factors discussed above helps to define an economet-
ric specification of DDR-WCs behaviour and performance within alternative objec-
tives of a cooperative. If the cooperative objective is to maximize the short run finan-
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cial benefits of the members (Sexton and Iskow, 1988), the patronage refund rate (PP),
measured as patronage refund (PR) divided by gross revenue (R), is an appropriate per-
formance indicator. On the other hand, the equity/total asset ratio (EA) may be a more
appropriate performance indicator in the presence of professional management. A pro-
fessional manager should prefer a capital structure that favors equity accumulation
over debt because highly leveraged cooperatives risk bankruptcy (Murray, 1983). 
Among other variables, both of these performance indicators can a priori be influ-
enced by: (a) the type of governance, i.e., professional management, expressed by the
existence of full time directors (Dir) and/or managers (Man); and (b) size quantified
by proxies like production in barrels (Prod)5 and number of members (NM). Thus, the
two alternative performance models, based on identical explanatory variables and
error term (ε) are: 
PP or EA= f (Dir, Man, Prod, NM) + ε (1)
Table 2 includes the definition of the variables used in the regression models,
highlighting the expected sign. It is expected that cooperatives with a professional-
ized management tend to transfer less revenue to the members (negative sign in PP)
and are less leveraged (positive sign in EA). The sign on Prod is expected to be pos-
itive possible due to scale economies. The effect of NM is not clear, a priori. The
effect of membership size depends on demographic, economic and social structure
and behaviour. For instance, either a small or large cooperative can favour short run
decisions of high patronage, rather than pursuing the longer-run goal of financial sus-
tainability for the cooperative, by diverting returns to equity. 
Combining the number of years in operation (20 years for most of the 22 cooper-
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definitions and Expected Signal
Variable Description Expected sign on PP Expected sign on EA
PP Share of gross revenuetransferred to patrons
EA Equity / Total asset ratio
Dir Full time directors, Dir=1, if yes; otherwise 0 Negative Positive
Man Full time managers, Man=1,if yes; otherwise 0 Negative Positive
Prod Total production (barrels) Positive Positive
NM Number of members Positive, negative or null Positive, negative or null
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atives), is obtained an unbalanced panel corresponding to 430 observations. Table 3
presents the descriptive statistics that correspond to total observations. The values
clearly show heterogeneous performance and different structures of governance and
size. On average, patronage accounts for 82% of the annual gross revenue generated
by DDR-WCs, with a high concentration (coefficient of variation 14.6%) around the
mean. The capital structure observed is 25%, however the coefficient of variation
(56%) indicates a relatively high dispersion and amplitude. Throughout the observed
period, 13 cooperatives have a professionalized management (full time director and
or manager): 8 have only full time directors; 11 have only a manager; and 6 have both. 
The total production (an average of 4,953 barrels and coefficient variation of
94.4%) and the number of members (mean of 615 and coefficient of variation of
62.3%) indicates heterogeneous sizes.
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6 Ignoring serial correlation (and/or heteroskedasticity) when it is present results in consistent but
inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients and biased standard errors.
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
Variable Mean StandardDeviation Minimum Maximum 
PP = Share of gross revenue transferred 
to patrons 0.82 0.12 0.03 1.39
EA = Equity/Total asset ratio 0.25 0.14 -0.69 0.74
Dir = Full time director 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Man = Full time managers 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00
Prod = Total production (barrels) 4,953 4,675 232 33,495
NM = Number of members 615 383 150 2,072
Considering the benefits from using panel data (Baltagi, 2009; Greene, 2003), both
linear regression models are estimated applying this approach. The econometric pro-
cedure started with the estimation of the random effects and fixed effects models.
Three statistical tests were conducted: (1) a Hausman test was conducted to test the
hypothesis that the random effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors, (2) a
Wald test was conducted to determine the existence of panel heteroskedasticity and (3)
a Woolridge test for first order serial correlation in panel data models was conducted.
From the application of the Hausman test, the hypothesis that the individual
effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model is rejected, i.e., the ran-
dom effects models are not the best choice, because the estimators become biased and
inconsistent. Additionally, the Wooldridge test allows the acceptance of the null
hypothesis of inexistence of first order serial correlation6 and the Wald test indicates
that the inexistence of groupwise heterocskedasticity cannot be rejected.
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7 Within the fixed effects models the computation of Likelihood Ratio tests suggest the use of one
way fixed group effects for cooperatives.
Given the results of these tests, Table 4 shows the econometric outputs of a
robust estimation of the fixed effects models7, being the standard errors corrected by
the White groupwise heteroskedasticity consistent covariance.
TABLE 4 
Econometric Results (Dependent Variables: PP and EA)
* Parameter significant at 1%; ** regression globally significant at 1% 
Model 1: PP
Parameter (Statistic t)
Model 2: EA
Parameter (Statistic t)
Dir -0.032 (-1.21) 0.063 (2.99)*
Man -0.053 (-2.89)* 0.125 (5.98)*
Prod 0.000 (3.90)* 0.000 (0.98)
NM 0.000 (1.41) -0.000 (-0.5)
Number of observations 430 430
Chi-square (degree of freedom -df) 144.86 (25)** 217.41 (25)**
R2 (explanatory – X – only) 0.0350 0.0615
R2 (group effects only) 0.2444 0.3484
R2 (X and group effects) 430 0.2860 0.3969
Both models are globally significant (Chi-square significant at 1%) and both show
a prominent influence of the group effects on the final fitted R2 and thus, reinforce
the presences of cooperative heterogeneity. Individually, in the model 1- PP, the 22
fixed effects estimated are all significant at the 1% level, versus a total of 20 in the
model 2 (18 at 1% and 2 at 10% level), with slightly less cooperative heterogeneity
in the EA model than in the model PP. 
The sign and individual significance of the parameters indicate that during the last
twenty years: 
Patronage Refund of DDR-WCs varies a lot among cooperatives. Moreover, it
is insensitive to the existence of full time directors and the number of members.
On the other hand, and consistent with expectations, the patronage refund
decreases with the existence of managers, and increases with the level (size) of
production. These results confirm the existence of a heterogeneous behaviour
among cooperatives. Although hampered by the existence professional man-
agers, the members of larger units prefer patronage refunds, possibly due to: (a)
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ill-defined property rights in the cooperative; (b) one-person, one-vote decision
making or (c) stronger economic dependence on the viticulture. The patronage
refund model leaves unanswered the question as to how long WCs can continue
the Mediterranean-style cooperative behavior before succumbing to increased
competition from the globalized wine industry.
Equity/Total Asset Ratio is insensitive to size, whether measured by total pro-
duction or number of members. Both the existence of full time directors and man-
agers is able to influence positively cooperative capital structure, as indicated by
the significance and the positive coefficient of the respective variables. The DDR-
WCs with professional management followed a strategy of equity reinforcement
to finance their assets, appearing to be more competitive in the long-run and able
to assume long run risk investments.
Summing up, the empirical results support the theoretical framework. The gover-
nance structure has opposite effects on the indicators of performance. When full-time
directors and managers have bargaining power, cooperatives transfer less revenue to
members and try to decrease leverage. 
5.  Final Remarks
Like many agricultural cooperatives, the DDR-WCs increasingly face survival
challenges related to financial issues that are linked to acquiring and redeeming mem-
ber equity capital, which can be a constraint on growth and sustainability. Increased
global competition accentuates these challenges.
This paper attempted to garner insight into the question of cooperative sustain-
ability by examining the effects of professional managers and full time directors. The
analysis is based on the assumption that DDR-WCs follow the traditional cooperative
model, only some of which have full time directors and/or managers. 
Two alternative performance indicators, patronage refund and capital structure,
were modelled. The results differ according to performance indicator. If the DDR-
WCs attempt to apply a short-run strategy of maximizing the revenues transferred to
patrons/members, the cooperative should not be managed by professional managers
and will increase the size, benefiting of possible scale economies. If, however, the
objective is to follow a long run strategy of improving the leverage, the cooperative
should be run by a professional management. These results reinforce the belief that
cooperatives structured differently have different and conflicting stakeholder inter-
ests. Cooperatives with non-professional management tend to maximize annual rev-
enues from the grape production; cooperatives with professional directors/managers
seek to reinforce equity, with a risk minimizing strategy.
The general results of our analysis suggest the cooperative organisation adopted
by DDR-WCs may not be sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets,
if they follow a practice of maximum patronage refund, which reduces their capacity
to improve leverage and to acquire profitable, but risky, long -run investments with
equity. Structural reorganization of the centuries old, atomistic Douro wine industry
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may be essential if adequate investment in new products and international markets are
to be fully incorporated in the decision making process8.
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